The purpose of this paper is to extend the Rights Egalitarian solution (Herrero, Maschler & Villar, 1999) to the context of nontransferable utility sharing problems. Such an extension is not unique. Depending on the kind of properties we want to preserve we obtain two di¤erent generalizations. One is the "proportional solution", that corresponds to the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution for surplus sharing problems and the solution in Herrero (1998) for rationing problems. The other is the "Nash solution", that corresponds to the standard Nash bargaining solution for surplus sharing problems and the Nash rationing solution (Mariotti & Villar (2005) ) for the case of rationing problems.
Introduction
Consider a group of agents that had formed a partnership in the past, each of them contributing with some amount of money. Now they are to disolve the partnership and have to split its total value among the partners, taking into account their entitlements (initial contributions). The question is how to allocate the proceeds among the incumbents. This is a distributive problem with an extremely simple mathematical structure: there is a certain amount of money (a scalar that can be either positive, zero or negative), to be distributed among a group of agents characterized by their entitlements (a vector of real numbers of any sign). Simple as it is, there is a good deal of possible solutions and a large stream of literature dealing with the properties of those solutions [e.g. Young (1987) , (1994) , Moulin (1988) , (2001), Thomson (2003) , for a review of the literature]. It is common to distinguishing between surplus sharing problems and rationing problems, depending on whether the amount to be divided exeeds or falls short of the aggregate entitlements.
Herrero, Maschler & Villar (1999) analyze in this context a particular solution, called the rights-egalitarian solution. This solution corresponds to the equal losses solution for rationing problems and the equal-gains solution for surplus sharing problems, under the assumption of unlimited liability. The rights-egalitarian solution exhibits a number of interesting axiomatic properties and can be supported from a game-theoretic perspective. The class of problems considered in that work refers to the allocation of a given amount of a divisible good as a function of a vector of entitlements that are expressed in the same units. That context might be asssociated to the case of transferable utilities that are linear in the good under consideration.
The purpose of this paper is to extend the rights egalitarian solution to non-transferable utility sharing problems. We shall assume, in particular, the standard framework of NTU cooperative game theory. Namely, agents are characterized by cardinal non-comparable utility functions, and all the information of the problem refers to the joint utility space. We …nd in this context several solutions for surplus sharing (or bargaining) problems as well as solutions for rationing problems [e.g. Nash (1950) , Kalai & Smorodinski (1975) , Chun & Thomson (1992) , Herrero (1998) , Mariotti & Villar (2005) ]. And also several solutions for the induced cooperative N T U games [in particular, Harsanyi (1963) , Shapley (1969) and Maschler & Owen (1992) ]. 1 The extension of the Rights Egalitarian solution to the case of NTU sharing problems is not unique. Depending on the kind of properties we want to preserve we obtain two di¤erent generalizations. One is the "proportional solution", that corresponds to the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution for surplus sharing problems and the solution in Herrero (1998) for rationing problems. The other is the "Nash solution", that corresponds to the standard Nash bargaining solution for surplus sharing problems and the Nash rationing solution (Mariotti & Villar (2005) ) for the case of rationig problems. The proportional solution preserves the self-duality nature of the Rights Egalitarian solution in this more general context, whereas the Nash solution preserves the idea of egalitarian allocations.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the rights-egalitarian solution in the conventional T U framework and provides a simple extension to the case of "hyperplane problems". Section 3 presents the general framework when agents'utilities are cardinal and non-comparable. It also analyzes the proportional solution and the Nash solution. Some …nal comments and remarks, in Section 4, close the paper.
2 The reference problem
Allocating a divisible good when agents have entitlements
A given amount of a divisible good is to be divided among a group of agents, each of them having an individual entitlement on it. Those agents form a partnership and the entitlements refer to their contributions to it. The amount of the good to be distributed corresponds to the liquidation value of the partnership. The problem is how to divide that value among the partners. A solution corresponds to a distribution that results from the application of some allocation rule. There is a number of sensible procedures to solve this problem, that can be associated to the nature of the property rights involved or the type of problem under consideration. Let us formalize these ideas. A problem is a triple [N; E; c], where N = f1; 2; :::; ng represents the set of agents (a …nite subset of N ; the set of potential agents), E 2 R is the liquidation value, and c 2 R n is the vector of entitlements. Let be the family of all problems. For any ! = [N; E; c] 2 ; call C(!) = P i2N c i , and
we are facing a problem of sharing losses from the aggregate entitlements, wereas if C(!) < E; our problem is one of surplus-sharing.
R jN j ; such that, for any
A problem is thus de…ned by means of an hyperplane H(!) with normal (1; 1; :::; 1) and a point c; both in R n : A solution is a point that satis…es two requirements: (i) it lies on H(!); i.e., the sum of the shares equals the liquidation value; and (ii) it does not exceed the entitlement on any agent for rationing problems nor gives anybody less than her entitlement for surplussharing problems. Note that this implies F (!) = c for those problems ! with c 2 H(!). In general, nonetheless, c = 2 H(!); namely, c lies in one of the semispaces in which the hyperplane H(!) divides R n :
Consider now the following solution, introduced in Herrero, Maschler & Villar (1999) :
The rights-egalitarian solution, F RE ; is given by:
The rights-egalitarian solution assigns to each agent her entitlement plus an equal share of the di¤erence between the estate and total entitlements. When E > C(!) (resp. E < C(!)) this corresponds to a surplus sharing (resp. a rationing) problem that is solved by distributing equally the net proceeds among the partners. Note that agents with positive entitlements may end up with a negative allotement in the liquidation of the partnership. That is, this solution assumes that the agents are the owners of the liquidation value, if positive, but they are also fully responsible for the total losses, if negative. The rights-egalitarian solution can thus be viewed as a combination of the equal-awards and equal-loss principles (hence its name).
For a problem ! 2 ; de…ne a point r(!) as follows: for each i 2 N; r i (!) is given by:
This value r i (!) tells us what agent i would obtain once all other agents receive their full entitlements. It is obvious that
that is, c and r(!) always lie on opposite sides of H(!): Furthermore, c and r(!) are symmetric points from H(!); i.e., they are mirror images of each other. Indeed, the problems ! = [N; E; c] and ! 0 = [N; E; r(!)] can be regarded as as dual problems, as r(! 0 ) = c. Let us call r(!) the reference point of problem !, and call c the entitlements or claims point.
Using the reference point r(!) we can re-write the Rights Egalitarian solution [1] as follows:
This expression provides still another interpretation of the Rights Egalitarian solution. It appears as the feasible point that assigns to each agent her entitlement plus the expected value of the lottery that gives equal probability to get c i and equal proability to get r i (!): This is a well-known method of fair division with linear utilities (random priority).
An elementary extension: Hyperplane problems
The very de…nition of the rights-egalitarian solution implies that all the data of the problem are formulated in the same units, so that we can aggregate and substract them. In order to extend this concept to more general environments we need …rst to extract the principle behind this allocation rule to make it independent on that common units feature.
We now consider a simple extension of the division problem discussed above. It refers to the case of allocating cardinal non-comparable utilities, rather than amounts of a given good, when the utility possibility set is de…ned by a hyperplane. This is a particular sub-family of the standard N T U sharing problem, to be analyzed below, that will play an auxiliary role in the ensuing discussion. Formally:
The family P H of hyperplane problems consists of all those problems (N; H(p; E); c) such that
Hyperplane sharing problems are a special class of N T U problems introduced in Maschler & Owen (1989) in order to provide a …rst extension of the Shapley value to N T U cooperative games (see Hart (1994) for a discussion of the class of situations that may generate this kind of problems). 2 Hyperplane problems di¤er from the standard division problem considered above in that the slope of the hyperplane is not 1 anymore and we are in a non-side payment scenario.
The extension of the rights egalitarian solution to this context is given by the following:
The extended rights-egalitarian solution,F ERE ; is the mapping F :
R jN j ; de…ned by the following condition, for all i 2 N :
The extended rights-egalitarian solution corresponds to the application of the same principle that de…nes the rights egalitarian solution, when units are di¤erent for di¤erent agents. Similarly, we de…ne the reference point r i in this context as follows:
Consider now the following concepts:
A proportional allocation is a point in which the amounts obtained by the agents equalize their relative gains or losses and the liquidation worth of the partnership, E; is fully distributed.
De…nition 7
An egalitarian allocation for a hyperplane problem (N; H(p; E); c) in P H ; is a point s such that
Besides requiring Pareto e¢ ciency this de…nition establishes that the weighted utility gains or losses of all agents should be equal, where the weights are given by the normal of the hyperplane that de…nes de hyperplane problem. Note that this notion can be interpreted as the outcome of maximizing a weighted utilitarian welfare function, in which agents enter with weights p 1 ; p 2 ; :::; p n ; in such a way that the allocation of utilities compensates the di¤erences in those weights.
The following result is obtained: 
(which is, precisely, equation [3] above). Then, it follows that:
an expression that corresponds precisely to the notion of proportional allocation. Moreover, the de…nition of extended rights-egalitarian allocation can be rewritten as:
that is the de…nition of the egalitarian allocation. Note that in both cases P n j=1 p j s j = E; which ensures the uniqueness part and the ful…llment of the e¢ ciency requirement.
Q.e.d.
Note that, for hyperplane problems, proportional and egalitarian allocations are uniquely de…ned and do coincide. This will not be the case for general N T U sharing problems (indeed the very notion of egalitarian allocation should be rede…ned for such a context). Also observe that, for surplus sharing problems, proportional allocations correspond to the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution whereas egalitarian allocations correspond to the Nash bargaining solution. For the case of rationing problems, proportional allocations and egalitarian allocations correspond, respectively, to the KalaiSmorodinsky and the Nash solution of the dual problem (N; H(p; E); r(N; H(p; E)).
Consider now the following properties, that adapt those with the same name in Herrero, Maschler & Villar (1999) :
Symmetry establishes that two agents whose weighted claims are equal will get equal amounts that also coincide when weighted in the same way.
Composition: For any ! = [N; H(p; E); c]; and any
Composition says that we can solve any problem in a sequencial manner. The solution to the original problem coincides with the sum of the solutions of two sub-problems, one in which we …rst allocate a fraction of the liquidation value and the other that in which we allocate the rest, reducing the original claims according to what agents already obtained.
We obtain the following characterization result:
The extended rights-egalitarian solution, F ERE ; is the only solution on P H that satis…es symmetry and composition.
Proof.-For a problem ! = (N; H(p; E); c); de…ne the following related problems, all in P :
By de…nition and symmetry, respectively, we have:
That is:
This result shows that the properties that characterize the rights egalitarian solution also characterize the extended version, once suitably translated to the new context. Nedless to say, when p i = 1 for all i; we are back to the standard set up.
The general model: NTU sharing problems
We now consider a more general social choice problem consisting of the allocation of utility gains and losses among a group of agents with non-transferable utilities and some utility value to be taken as the "entitlements utility". To be precise, let N = f1; 2; :::; ng stand for a collection of agents, each of which is endowed with a cardinal non-comparable utility function u i and a utility point c i ; to be interpreted as her status quo or her claims point. Again, we can think of this situation as a case in which agents in N have to share the proceeds of some collective project, be them gains or losses. The entitlements vector can be interpreted as an expression of rights, aspirations or secured outcomes, depending of the type of problem at hand. This type of problem can thus be summarized in a set of agents N; a utility possibility set S R n ; and a point c 2 R n : A choice must be made out of the feasible set of utility allocations S depending on the distinguished utility vector c.
Preliminary de…nitions
Each agent i 2 N = f1; 2; :::; ng is characterised by a pair (u i ; c i ); where u i is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, de…ned on some suitable (commodity) space, and c i is a distinguished utility value. The set S R n describes the collection of utility allocations which are feasible, while the vector c 2 R n denotes the entitlements or claims vector. A N T U sharing problem (or a problem, for short) is a triple (N; S; c): There are two types of problems. One corresponds to N T U rationing problems, in which c = 2 S and the agents are to share the losses of some joint venture. The other refers to N T U surplus sharing problems, in which c 2 S and the question is how to allocate the gains of some cooperative entreprise.
The set of utility allocations that are admissible, denoted by A(N; S; c); is de…ned as follows:
A(N; S; c) = fs 2 S = s cg if c = 2 S fs 2 S = s cg if c 2 S This set is made out of those utility allocations in which agents obtain utilities which are bounded by the reference vector c; above or below depending on whether (N; S; c) is a rationing or a surplus sharing problem. Moreover, we de…ne the (weak) Pareto frontier of the set of admissible allocations, as follows:
PA(N; S; c) = fs 2 A(N; S; c) = s 0 >> s =) s 0 = 2 A(N; S; c)g
We concentrate on a family P of problems that satis…es some elementary restrictions.
De…nition 10
The family P of standard N T U sharing problems consists of all those problems (N; S; c) such that: (i) S R n is closed, convex, and comprehensive; and (ii) For all i 2 N; PA(N; S; c) \ fs 2 R n j s i > c i g 6 = ?:
The set S is closed and convex when utility functions are continuous and concave. Comprehensiveness means that if s 2 S and s 0 2 R n is such that s 0 s; then s 0 2 S: It is related to the monotonicity of the utility functions and implies that the relevant boundary of the utility possibility set is downward sloping and coincides with the set of weakly e¢ cient utility allocations. Part (ii) of the de…nition says that agents' admissible gains and losses are bounded. From a geometrical viewpoint it implies that PA(N; S; c) intersects all axes of c + R n : Note that these properties ensure that PA(N; S; c) is a non-empty compact subset of R n (more speci…cally of c R n + for rationing problems and of c + R n + for surplus sharing problems).
De…nition 11 A solution to a N T U sharing problem is a mapping :
R jN j that for all (N; S; c) 2 P selects a subset (N; S; c) 6 = ; in
PA(N; S; c):
Points in (N; S; c) represent sensible compromises in the allocation of utility gains or losses, depending on the nature of the problem, that is chosen in the Pareto frontier of the set of admissible allocations. Note that the way in which this notion is de…ned implies that s i c i for all i 2 N; whenever s 2 (N; S; c) and (N; S; c) is a rationing problem (resp. s i c i for all i; whenever s 2 (N; S; c) and (N; S; c) is a surplus sharing problem).
One more element is to be de…ned. For a given problem (N; S; c) 2 P the point r i (N; S; c) describes the maximum value of agent i's utility when u j = c j for all j 6 = i:
Notice that r i (N; S; c) represents the highest value of s i that is compatible with all other agents getting their entitlements (c in this case) in full. When (N; S; c) is a rationing problem this scalar represents agent i's worst admissible outcome. On the contrary, in a surplus problem r i (N; S; c) tells us agent i's best possible outcome.
If we consider the problems (N; S; c) and (N; S; r(N; S; c)) ; it happens that r(N; S; r(N; Sc)) = c; that is those are dual problems.
The Proportional solution to sharing problems
Let (N; S; c) 2 P be a sharing problem and let [c; r(N; S; c)] denote the line segment that joins points c and r(N; S; c): We now extend the notion of proportionality involved in the rights-egalitarian solution to this context in a natural way:
De…nition 12
The proportional solution is the mapping P :
such that, for all (N; S; c) 2 P ; selects the (unique) point in the intersection of PA(N; S; c) with [c; r(N; S; c)]:
Trivially s = P (N; S; c) if and only if s is a proportional allocation, as de…ned above.
In order to characterize the proportional solution, let us consider the following axioms:
A¢ ne invariance: Let (S) = fy 2 R n = y = (s); for some s 2 S; with i (s) = i s i + i ; i > 0g: Then, (N; (S) ; (c)) = ( (N; S; c)). This axiom postulates that solutions must be independent of positive a¢ ne transformations. It simply translates the underlying assumption of cardinal non-comparable utility functions.
Symmetry: For all (N; S; c) 2 P ; if S is symmetric with respect the 45 o line, and c i = c j for all i; j 2 N; then f 0 1g 2 (N; S; 0) for some scalar 0 :
Symmetry is an equity restriction. It establishes that if agents cannot be distinguished in a problem, they cannot be distinguished in a solution. The following result is easily obtained:
Proposition 13
The proportional solution P is the only solution in P satisfying a¢ ne invariance, symmetry, and monotonicity.
Proof. Obviously, P satis…es all the requirements. Let now be a solution ful…lling them all. Let (N; S; c) 2 P be a problem. By a¢ ne invariance, we may apply a transformation so that 
Egalitarian allocations and the Nash solution to sharing problems.
Let now (N; S; c) 2 P denote a general convex sharing problem. We now extend the notion of egalitarian allocations to this context in a natural way: De…nition 14 Let (N; S; c) be a sharing problem in P . An egalitarian allocation is a point s 2 PA(N;
Part (i) is an e¢ ciency condition and establishes that the vector p of weights is perpendicular to S at the boundary point s 2 S: In that way, p provides an endogenous weighting system for a weighted utilitarian social welfare function, and s is as a maximiser of such a function. Part (ii) says that those weights inversely proportional to their utilities (i.e. we give more weight in social welfare to those agents with smaller utilities). 3 An egalitarian allocation on a general convex problem selects points s 2 PA(N; S; 0) which admit supporting hyperplanes that de…ne hyperplane problems whose solution is, precisely, s : Therefore, the notion of egalitarian allocations extends further the concept of rights-egalitarian allocations to situations where the feasible utility space does not have a linear frontier and, as a consequence, the lottery-equivalent method of division yields Pareto-dominated outcomes (see [3] ).
The next result tells us that egalitarian allocations always exist (and also how they look like): 4 Proposition 15 Every N T U sharing problem (N; S; c) in P has an egalitarian allocation.
Proof.
We divide the proof in two parts, one for the case of rationing problems and the other for the case of surplus sharing problems. Without loss of generality we take the normalized version of the problem, that is, we let c = 0:
(i) Rationing problems. De…ne a mapping :
R jN j as follows: for each problem (N; S; 0) 2 P , (N; S; 0) is the set of maximisers of n i=1 ( s i ) over the set Q = fs 2 R n = s = 2 intSg. The set (N; S; 0) is trivially nonempty as the objective function is continuous and the feasible set is compact. To see that the points s 0 2 (N; S; 0) satisfy the required conditions, …rst observe that s 0 must be a point on the relative interior of the boundary of the convex set S: Therefore there exists a hyperplane with normal p >> 0 that supports S at s 0 : That is, = p s 0 p s for all s 2 S: De…ne now T = fz 2 R n = p z g and consider the problem of maximizing n i=1 ( s i ) over T: As T Q, s 0 must be a solution of this problem. Since the relevant boundary of T is smooth we can immediately deduce from the …rst order conditions that p i s Egalitarian allocations obtain from the extreme values of the product of the agents'utilities on di¤erent sets. For rationing problems they result from the minimization of the product of the unfeasible allocations. For surplus sharing problems they correspond to the maximization of the product on the set of possible gains. Note that, due to the convexity properties of the feasible sets and the function that is maximized, a problem (N; S; 0) 2 P may have several egalitarian allocations when it is a rationing problem, but admits a unique egalitarian allocation when it corresponds to a surplus sharing problem. Indeed, egalitarian allocations correspond to the Nash bargaining solution (Nash (1950) ) for the case of surplus sharing problems and to the Nash rationing solution (Mariotti & Villar (2005) ) for the case of rationing problems.
That suggests the following:
De…nition 16 The mapping N : P ! R n that associates to each problem (N; S; 0) the set of egalitarian allocations will be called the Nash solution to sharing problems.
In order to characterize this solution we need to introduce the following familiar axiom: This axiom says the following: Take a given problem and suppose that the utility possibility set is reduced, without the reference vector c being altered. Suppose furthermore that the original solution is still part of the reduced set.
Then, the solution of the new problem must be part of the solution of the original one.
Our next result shows that egalitarian allocations correspond precisely to the outcome of the unique minimal solution that satis…es a¢ ne invariance, symmetry and contraction consistency. Formally:
Proposition 18
The Nash Solution is the only minimal (in the order of set inclusion) solution satisfying a¢ ne invariance, symmetry and contraction consistency.
Proof.
For rationing problems, see Mariotti & Villar (2005) . For surplus sharing problems, see Nash (1950) .
Note that the Nash solution may be multi-valued for rationing problems and it is single-valued for surplus-sharing problems.
Final comments
In this paper we have explored how the rights-egalitarian solution extends to N T U sharing problems. This solution recommends an equal split of the net worth of the partnership. The fact that the standard division problem is linear and symmetric, together with the unlimited liability assumption, implies that many solutions coincide yield the allocation prescribed by the rights-egalitarian one in the T U case. When we consider a richer domain of problems, the notion of equal split should be rede…ned. There is no unique way of making such an extension. In the special case of hyperplane problems we have provided two alternative de…nitions of the rights egalitarian solution, that stress two di¤erent aspects embedded in this notion. One is the idea of proportionality: all agents get equal relative gains or losses. The other is associated with the notion of egalitarain allocations, de…ned by equal weighted net gains or losses from the entitlements point. Both principles yield the same (unique) allocation for hyperplane problems. Yet, when we apply them to general N T U sharing problems, they give rise to two di¤erent solutions in that context: the proportional solution and the Nash solution.
The proportional solution coincides with the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution for N T U surplus-sharing problems, and coincides with the solution proposed by Herrero (1998) for the case of N T U rationing problems. The Nash solution coincides with the Nash bargainign solution for surplus-sharing problems and with the Nash-rationing solution (Mariotti & Villar, 2005 ) for rationing problems. Both ways of extending the rights egalitarian solution can be axiomatically characterized by means of properties very much in the spirit of their bargaining counterparts. Another diference between them is their behaviour with respect to dual problems. While for the proportional solution, dual problems have identical solutions, this is not so for the Nash solution.
Finally, let us underline that those solutions can be supported from a game theoretic viewpoint and coincide with some well-known game theoretical solutions. Two T U games can be associated to any T U sharing problem: (1) (N; v) and (N; z) are dual games; (2) The rights-egalitarian solution coincides with both the Shapley value and the prenucleolus of both (N; v) and (N; z); (3) If C(!) E; then F RE (!) coincides with the Shapley value, the Tau value, the Prenucleolus, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the kernel of the game (N; v); and (4) If C(!) E; then F RE (!) coincides with the Shapley value, the Tau value, the Prenucleolus, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the kernel of the game (N; z):
Given a N T U sharing problem (N; S; c) 2 P , we can associate a N T U game as follows (ii) Egalitarian allocations coincide with the Harsanyi value for weights p 2 R n ++ [see Harsanyi (1963) , Hart (1985) , Hart & Mas-Colell (1989) ].
